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Two developments pose dilemmas for well established discounting techniques:  (1) The 
extremely long time horizons associated with recently prominent environmental policy problems, 
such as climate change and nuclear waste storage, have made it important to take seriously both 
benefits to future generations and extreme uncertainties in projecting the returns to policies and 
future well being.  (2) Findings in the burgeoning field of behavioral economics have made it 
clear that individuals routinely depart significantly from rational prescriptions when making 
choices over time, thus undermining a bulwark of the discounting approach. These two sets of 
dilemmas are addressed in a series of papers under the headings normative analyses and 
behavioral analyses.  These papers use concepts from psychology and philosophy to complement 
their economic approach.     
 
JEL Classification: C25, D91, Q25 




Discounting is like subatomic physics, only the math is easier.  Just when we have it 
mastered, new phenomena change our understanding.  Moreover, that new understanding often 
raises deep philosophical problems.  This special issue of the Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 
takes on the intertwined problems of time and uncertainty.  It explores discounting dilemmas that 
arise in two contexts:  (1) societal choices that involve extremely long time dimensions, implying 
substantial uncertainties, and (2) individuals’ time-related behaviors, where their natural 
propensities lead them to deviate substantially from traditional prescriptions.  These are 
respectively the normative and behavioral categories that organize this issue.            
In Irving Fisher’s day with discounting, like Isaac Newton’s day with physics, most was 
resolved.  Getting the discount rate right was no harder than predicting how a ball would roll 
down an inclined plane or where a tangency might be found between a curve and a line.  
Individuals and firms would equate their marginal rates of substitution for consumption across 
time periods to the market rate of interest.  Savers and investors would employ the same rates. 
Then public finance and welfare economics swung into action, and governments became 
a major player.  Market imperfections got attention, and a profound literature emerged on the 
social rate of discount.  Though the controversy was never completely resolved, it was widely 
recognized that we live in a second-best world, and that the government could not simply use 
market rates when making its investment decisions.  As the debate swirled, the government 
finally settled on rates to be employed for various projects.  For example, in 2008, the 
government recommended using discount rates of 3% and 7% for analyzing government 
regulations.1  By contrast, corporations were using hurdle rates of 15% to 20%, the riskless rate 
of interest was 2% for 3-month Treasury bills and 4% for 10-year government bonds, and 
consumers were investing in savings accounts yielding at best 2%, but were borrowing on credit 
cards on rates near the corporate hurdle rates.  In short, Irving Fisher’s equilibrium outcome was 
far from being realized.   
The economist’s ideal equilibrium relative to discounting was thwarted in another 
respect:  Prescriptions that economists widely accepted were widely ignored by the real world, 
                                                          




even in such hard-headed domains as finance.  Let us mention two examples.  Economists 
generally agree that whoever is the decision maker, the discount rate should not be adjusted for 
risk.  The preferred approach, roughly speaking, is to address risk by converting monetary 
payoffs to certainty equivalents, and then do the discounting.  To be sure, such calculations 
become a bit more complicated when there are liquidity constraints along the way, when both 
consumption and wealth are involved, when decisions along the way can be adjusted in response 
to intermediate outcomes, etc.  But the lesson is clear.  Risk is risk, and time preference is time 
preference.  Though risk and time are inevitably entangled as we confront them, they should be 
separated as best as possible when we analyze them.  Despite such understanding, real world 
decision makers routinely raise their discount rates when confronted with risk.  Even on Wall 
Street, concepts such as certainty equivalents and utility theory may be used by some 
technicians, but not by the major players. 
Perhaps more surprising, the most sophisticated players in finance shun the concept of 
discounted present value.  The language of venture capitalists, real estate developers, and private 
equity investors revolves around internal rates of return, with the ubiquitous abbreviation IRRs.  
At times, these practitioners talk about returns in terms of multiples of invested capital.  But they 
virtually never tell you that for someone with a personal discount rate of say 10%, the investment 
of $100,000 was worth $YYY at the outset, when $YYY is the relevant number.  The use of IRR 
numbers would make sense if someone could continually reinvest at that rate, but that is rarely 
the case.  This hard-to-buck convention makes a difference, and often leads to short-termism and 
otherwise poor decisions.  There can be little doubt, for example, that some private equity 
managers may sell out an investment in three years to secure a reported IRR of say 25%, when 
most of their investors would far prefer a 20% return that persisted over seven years.    
In recent years, two phenomena have stepped in to drastically change economists’ 
thinking about discount rates:  the behavioral economics revolution and the climate change 
debate.  The first is internal to the profession, the second is well beyond it.  Each of these 
phenomena has had concerns of risk and time in the forefront.  Behavioral economists and 
psychologists have found that many anomalies in individual choice pertain to how people handle 
the risk and time dimensions of decisions.  Similarly, policymakers in the climate change debate 
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and other long-term environmental contexts must grapple with tremendous risks, particularly 
with respect to temporally distant impacts. 
Every parent is familiar with myopia or excessive impatience, or what modern 
economists call hyperbolic or beta-delta discounting.  Presumably such impatience was 
recognized in antiquity, though economists did not get to it until the 19th century,2 and did not 
give it rigorous treatment till near the end of the 20th century.  Many other anomalies relating to 
time preference have emerged, such as a preference for improving consumption streams 
(sometimes bizarrely coupled with myopia), but none so powerful as the extreme preference for 
present payoffs.   Samuelson, in this issue, provides historical perspective on these 
developments.  
Economists’ efforts have expanded well beyond conceptual models of discounting 
behavior.  In recent years, they have conducted innumerable laboratory experiments and surveys 
to assess the time tradeoffs of individuals.  Three papers in the current volume—those by 
Viscusi, Huber, and Bell; by Frederick and Lowenstein; and by Chabris et al.—represent 
contributions in this tradition.   
  Other disciplines are in this time-tradeoff business as well, most notably psychologists.  
A salient early study by psychologists3 anticipated later economic work relating patience to 
subsequent life success.4  Young children who were able to resist eating a marshmallow, or 
equivalent, for a period in return for a second marshmallow reward did better in their adolescent 
competencies.  Follow-up studies showed that they did better on their SAT scores and in years of 
higher education secured.  Recent work by psychologists on happiness, often working in 
conjunction with economists, has raised the question whether the economist’s discounting 
                                                          
2 See the helpful survey article by Frederick et al. (2002), which provides both a history of discounting and a 
thorough review of recent literature.     
3 Mischel et al. (1988).  
4 Samuelson (2008) briefly discusses the patience-success relationship.  Chabris et al. (2008) relate laboratory-
measured discount rates to 15 field behaviors and indicators, such as smoking, exercise, and body-mass index. 
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model, whatever rates are employed, misses many fundamental forces.5  To illustrate, time spent 
on an activity may correlate weakly with the pleasure or pain it is reported to cause, a 
phenomenon called duration neglect, whereas experience at the peak or very end may count 
heavily.6  Reported happiness diverges strongly from sums achieved by applying weighting 
factors to streams of returns (such as reported subjective well being) over time.  The implications 
of such findings for measuring happiness are not clear.  How strongly should we value 
retrospective reports relative to time diaries, for example?  Adding time-delay concerns to the 
assessment would only make the question harder.7  
Very recent studies using fMRI scans (McClure et al. 2004) have shown that anticipated 
immediate and future rewards show up in different locations in the brain, which starts to explain 
the divergence between observed actions and economists’ normative models.  But even a full 
explanation would merely stir additional debate on the established question as to whether people 
should respond as their brains incline or as economists prescribe.    
Behavioral economics and climate change, our principal environmental case study, are 
strange bedfellows.  Behavioral economics, working from inside the profession, has raised the 
importance for discounting theory and practice of how individuals actually behave.  Climate-
change concerns have raised the importance of the question of how societies ought to behave.  
Behavioral economics suggests that (or at least explains why) individuals should be free to 
                                                          
5 Psychologists have also chronicled a variety of systematic mistakes in the way humans contemplate the future.    
For example, individuals make the effective forecasting error that “hedonic states will be less intense in the future 
than in the present,” which obviously leads to strong present orientation.  See Kassam et al. (in press).   
 
6Redelmeier (a physician) and Kahneman (1996) showed this in a well known experiment using colonoscopies.   
Leaving the probe in gently at the end, producing an increment of discomfort, yielded a less negative recollected 
experience.  Kahneman (1997) and colleagues distinguish among decision utility, experienced utility, and 
remembered utility.  They go on (p. 375) to “propose a formal normative theory of the total experienced utility of 
temporally extended outcomes.”  Their treatment suggests that economists had banished experienced utility in favor 
of decision utility.  However, we view their proposal as consistent with the stream of period or continuous utilities 
framework that populates so many contemporary economic models.   They are not full fellow travelers; their 
proposal favors time neutrality over discounting.      
7 See the ambitious proposal by Krueger et al. (2007) to measure well being through what they label a National Time 
Accounting approach.  It attempts to measure a society’s subjective well-being, based on time allocation and 




march to their own time beat, a beat much faster than the normal economics tempo, at least in the 
short run.  Reflections on climate-change concerns, by contrast, have led a number of 
economists, including a few contributing to this volume, to consider applying much lower 
discount rates to long-term problems than economists normally employ.  
Normative analyses 
  Many of the most important societal problems will play out over extremely long time 
horizons.  What happens tomorrow is uncertain.  What happens over 15,000 tomorrows is 
massively uncertain, and so it is with climate change, the dangers of killer asteroids, and year 
2050 energy sources and cancer cures.  The normative analyses presented in this issue, which in 
some cases are informed by behavioral studies, include contributions by Samuelson, Summers 
and Zeckhauser, Dasgupta, Gollier, and Fels and Zeckhauser.  These articles develop the general 
economic principles for discounting, particularly when there are risks to distant generations.   
The central role of the discount rate in environmental policy assessments is well 
illustrated by simple calculations of the value of $1 in benefits in 50 years and in 100 years.  
With a time discount rate of 3%, which is consistent with the lower value in OMB guidelines and 
calculations of climate change effects by economists such as Nordhaus (1994), the present value 
of $1 equals $0.23 in 50 years, and $0.05 in 100 years.  The alternative OMB discount rate of 7% 
leads to a present value of $1 equal to $0.03 after 50 years and $0.001 in 100 years.  The famed 
Stern Report (2006) on climate change utilized a time discount rate of 0.1% for tallying benefits, 
which is close to not discounting at all, and is a low outlier in the debate.8  Using that rate, the 
present value of $1 in benefits is $0.95 if they are received in 50 years and $0.90 if they are 
received in 100 years.  Stern’s positive, albeit miniscule, rate comes not from time preference, 
nor because we value future generations less than our own.  Such preferences he finds ethically 
indefensible, and draws support from Ramsey, Pigou and later distinguished writers.  Rather, it 
allows for the possibility that human life may not exist in the future, perhaps smitten by a 
meteorite (Stern (2007), pp. 35-37, 53).  
                                                          




If we exclude discount rates for benefits such as 7% as being too high, which most 
economists believe is the case, then the main intellectual battleground is whether we should be 
using discount rates in the range of 3% or discounting by only a token nonzero amount, such as 
0.1%.   
The potentially dominant role of discounting in long-term policy analyses, in conjunction 
with the embodied substantial uncertainties, is strikingly illustrated in the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency’s (EPA) analysis of nuclear waste storage at Yucca Mountain, a site about 
100 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada.9  EPA initially prepared a regulatory analysis 
providing for the sufficient safety of the nuclear waste storage for 10,000 years, but in response 
to a Federal court decision it extended the period for analysis demonstrating safe storage to 1 
million years.  To put these time frames in perspective, recorded human history spans only 5,000 
years, and homo sapiens have walked the earth for a mere 120,000 years.  Even at the more 
immediate 10,000 year time period, a $1 benefit valued at a 3% discount rate would have a 
present value of only $4.2x10-129.  The present economic value of exposing the entire current 
U.S. population to a lethal dose of radiation in 10,000 years is so small that it would drop out of 
the analysis at any reasonable discount rate.  Perhaps because discounting would obliterate the 
value of such remote benefits, EPA didn’t provide a present value calculation of the 1 million 
years of secure storage.   
The EPA analysis assures us that the nuclear waste stored underground at Yucca 
Mountain will expose nobody in the next 10,000 years to a radiation level of over 15 millirems 
of radiation.  Even more striking is its assurance that nobody in the next million years will be 
exposed to more than 350 millirems.  That is half the average background radiation risk currently 
faced by Colorado residents.  EPA avoided the question, which a skeptical economist might 
pose, of what probabilities should be attached to such terms as “nobody” and “secure” when 
applied to million-year periods.  As we move from 100 years to 10,000 years, the crystal ball for 
safety goes from cloudy to pitch black.  And million year projections surely transform regulatory 
                                                          
9 U.S. Environmental  Protection Agency, Public Health and Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for 




impact analyses from bureaucratic documents into science fiction fantasies.  The articles in this 
issue stop well short of fantasia; they reside in plausibilia.  Thus, they address time frames going 
from days to decades and from decades to centuries, but never get close to millennia.    
Challenges raised by greenhouse gas emissions are the prime policy issue addressed in 
these papers.  Many policy problems have long-term consequences, but few have crystallized 
intellectual examination of the far future, particularly by economists, as strongly as has the 
potential for climate change.  It is quite possible that actions taken today, notably the emission of 
greenhouse gases, will have significant consequences on people living 100 or 200 years hence.  
Here you will find Summers and Zeckhauser (2008), drawing on both psychological and 
philosophical principles, who suggest that the weights put on the welfares of far future 
generations should be much closer to those of nearby generations than any traditional 
discounting formulation would produce.  Gollier (2008), employing a neoclassical model, shows 
how appropriate concern for the distribution and persistence of future growth rates will lead to a 
systematic decline in discount rates as the future stretches forward.   Fels and Zeckhauser (2008) 
put a philosophical nail in the constant-discount-rate coffin.  They show that perfect altruism 
(treating all pairs of successive generations alike) is inconsistent with total altruism (valuing 
other generations’ altruistic preferences, not merely their felicities from consumption).   These 
three papers, and most notably that of Dasgupta (2008), should be viewed alongside the Stern 
Report.  Dasgupta reviews the climate change discount rate controversy the Stern Report raised, 
and then wades into the subsequent swirl of economic debate.   
We now review our normative papers in more detail.  Samuelson conducts an historical 
tour of discounting concepts.  He observes that behavior that shortchanges savings and other 
excessively impatient or Pollyannish actions had been observed, bemoaned and exploited eons 
before credit cards entered our wallets or myopia the economist’s vocabulary.  He observes that 
patience and prosperity will be bed partners, as will their opposites, and then generalizes the 
lesson, identifying shortsighted choices in areas ranging from sex to smoking.  He then derides 
laws against usury, taking kings, the Old Testament, a couple of religions, and Karl Marx to task.  
Chicago economics gets poked along the way.  Samuelson—capitalizing on his multiple-decade 
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perspective—closes by identifying optimal life-cycle investing strategy: keep steady allocations 
as you go.     
Summers and Zeckhauser take on the problem of policymaking for the long-term future, 
what they label posterity.  They employ a variety of paradigmatic choice problems to illustrate 
the problems and insights into methods for valuing future consequences.  Thus, they ask such 
questions as:  (1) If given a choice would you destroy a threatening comet to return in 100 years, 
or one in 300 years, if the latter represented a 10 times greater threat?  (2) Why do you treat 
dropping litter so differently from failing to pick it up?  (3) What fraction of your income would 
you give up to avoid a 1% chance of a cataclysm that would kill you as it made the human 
species extinct?  (4) If your predecessors set a noble precedent by saving more for you, will you 
follow it, hoping that strengthens the precedent for your descendants, or would you free ride by 
consuming some of your inheritance?  They use such questions, traditional economics and 
behavioral economics to address policymaking for posterity, first for a certain world and then for 
an uncertain world.  The example of actions against climate change suffuses their discussion.  
Under certainty, they find a case for giving more weight to the distant future, taking more actions 
on its behalf, than would be implied by choosing “reasonable” parameters for the fundamental 
discounting equation.   Their conclusions from the uncertainty analysis push in opposite 
directions from conventional wisdom, primarily because they find that in a von Neumann-
Morgenstern framework logic does not support assigning infinite negative value to even the 
extinction of human life.  Their model of uncertainty and learning, developed for the climate 
change example, shows that greater uncertainty may increase or decrease the optimal percentage 
of total expected mitigation undertaken in the first period.  Summers and Zeckhauser close with a 
discussion of reaction function issues.  That is, they assess how current efforts to help the future, 
say to curb greenhouse gas emissions, will affect alternative investments of benefit to the future, 
actions by other generations and other nations, and technological developments. 
Dasgupta develops a model of how time preference and societal preferences for income 
distribution across time should influence the valuation of such deferred policy impacts.  His 
framework is driven by key ethical assumptions, relating in particular to intergenerational 
inequality in consumption.  In Dasgupta’s model, the consumption discount rate, which 
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determines the weights placed on consumption levels at different times, plays a key role.  In any 
year t, it is the sum of the time discount rate and a term that is the product of the predicted 
growth in consumption from year t to t+1 and the elasticity of what he calls marginal felicity, 
i.e., instantaneous marginal utility of consumption.  Dasgupta favors a time discount rate of 
approximately zero, which accords better with the Stern Report’s 0.1% value than the U.S. 
government-recommended time discount rates.   However, Dasgupta departs from the Stern 
Report approach in that he favors a higher value of the elasticity of marginal felicity than used in 
past climate change studies.  Therefore, he would place a very high social weight on avoiding the 
risk of inequality of consumption levels for future generations.  Dasgupta’s belief that there 
should be a very strong concern with possible future inequality seems initially inconsistent with 
the current generation’s willingness to tolerate substantial current income inequality across 
nations.  However, he discusses this observation and suggests that our willingness to reduce 
inequality for future generations should be greater than our apparent willingness to fund efforts 
to eliminate dire poverty, say in African countries.   His elegant formulation requires economists 
to concern themselves not merely with estimating the highly uncertain climate change effects, 
but also with the temporal trajectory of income inequality, a theme echoed by the next article. 
Gollier follows the classic discounting approach, which posits that a dollar today is worth 
more than a dollar tomorrow, because the marginal utility of consumption is decreasing when 
consumption grows over time.  If consumption growth follows a Markov process, everything is 
copasetic:  constant discounting does an excellent job given an appropriate CRRA utility 
function.   Gollier observes that prosperity may be just around the corner, and many corners after 
that.  But history is also filled with long slumps and slowdowns, often associated with afflictions 
such as wars and plagues.   He then develops the theory of appropriate discounting when there 
are future uncertain shocks to growth.  With only this slight but realistic departure from standard 
assumptions, Gollier is able to show that as time stretches forward the discount rates we should 
apply at present will drop.  Basically, that is due to an asymmetry between the effects of high and 
low growth rates.  Call the average long-term growth rate middle.  Looking to the far distance, an 
uptick in growth rates will matter little; a dollar will be worth virtually nothing with either rate.  
But if the growth rate oozes to low over a long period, and sticks there, a future dollar will gain 
significant value, in part because of risk aversion and disappointing consumption.  Gollier 
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divides discount rates into two components, a wealth effect and a precautionary effect.  The latter 
protects against low growth rates.   Alternative specifications have proper discount rates falling 
from 4.3% to 3.4% over 100 years, and from 3.5% to 1% over a millennium.  
Fels and Zeckhauser take altruism seriously.  They posit that generations, or for that 
matter altruistic individuals, should respect the preferences of those for whom they have 
altruism.  Thus, if those generations are altruistic, their full utility function should be considered, 
not just the felicity they get from own consumption.  They show that this concept, total altruism, 
can yield a functional form that depends only on each generation’s felicity of consumption.  
They show, however, that what has been labeled perfect altruism, namely that a generation value 
itself relative to a successor the way it values any two successive generations, is incompatible 
with total altruism.  They close with a philosophical pitch for having altruism stretch backward 
as well as forward, and claim that the real world at times respects such backward looking 
preferences. 
Behavioral analyses 
 The three behavioral papers presented here explore issues pertaining to discounting and 
risks over time for situations quite apart from climate change, and generally much shorter term.  
These papers flow in the spirit of the behavioral economics literature, which has identified a 
variety of systematic anomalies in how people make choices involving critical time dimensions. 
The papers utilize a broad range of approaches and address several different topics.  Viscusi, 
Huber, and Bell use a national survey to elicit people’s stated preferences with respect to a series 
of hypothetical environmental policy choices.  Their approach consequently addresses behavioral 
issues but adopts a methodology more common within the environmental stated preference 
literature.  Their results provide an empirical basis for estimating individual utility functions for 
policy costs and for environmental quality at different points in time.  The Frederick and 
Loewenstein article utilizes the more familiar approach in the behavioral economics literature, 
namely relying on a variety of convenience samples, ranging from members of a jury pool to 
various student groups.  The sample members respond to a series of hypothetical choice 
decisions.  The novelty of the study is their analysis of whether the trajectory over time in the 
pattern of these choices fundamentally affects the choices that people make.  The final 
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behavioral paper by Chabris et al. uses convenience samples of respondents drawn from the local 
population, complemented by a Web sample, with special emphasis on recruiting people with 
particular risk-related characteristics such as being significantly overweight.  Their paper 
combines an analysis of behavioral responses to a series of hypothetical choices to explore 
whether revealed behavioral anomalies with strong intertemporal implications are strongly 
predictive of behaviors such as smoking.   
Turning to the three behavioral papers in greater detail, Viscusi, Huber, and Bell (2008) 
utilize a choice-based conjoint approach to consider how people value improvements in the 
water quality of lakes and rivers.  These improvements would begin either immediately, or after 
a delay of 2 to 6 years.  The structure of the stated preference survey makes it possible to 
estimate utility functions for policy costs and water quality improvements at different points in 
time.  Those who have visited lakes and rivers for recreational purposes in the past year have 
higher willingness-to-pay values for water quality improvements than those who did not, not 
surprisingly.  What is striking is that they also have lower rates of time preference for 
improvements throughout the time frames considered.  Based on these results we hypothesize 
that environmentalists may be more forward looking.  While there is some evidence of 
hyperbolic discounting at play for those who visited lakes and rivers, that factor is dwarfed by 
the 20% discount rate of those who made no visits, which are two to three times the visitors’ 
discount rates.  For non-visitors, the valuation of deferred environmental effects takes two blows: 
low initial valuation and a high discount rate.  
A key component of climate change policies and other environmental efforts with an 
important temporal dimension is that what is at stake is not environmental quality at a point in 
time but rather an entire trajectory of quality outcomes.  Advocates of aggressive forms of 
intervention generally paint a bleak picture of a steady deterioration in the livability of the planet.  
How people react to such trajectories is the focus of the article by Frederick and Loewenstein 
(2008). When allocating a fixed pattern of positively valued payoffs over time, a trajectory in 
which the values are front-loaded should be preferred because of pure time preference, the 
opportunity costs associated with delay, and uncertainty regarding whether deferred rewards will 
ever be paid.  However, some studies have suggested that people favor upward sloping 
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trajectories for a variety of reasons: greater anticipatory utility, the contrast between the higher 
future rewards and lower levels that one has become accustomed to, and the belief that one can 
extrapolate the positive trend into the future.  Frederick and Loewenstein analyze these 
preferences for sequences using both an allocation procedure in which a discrete choice is made 
among the available options as well as a pricing procedure in which willingness-to-pay amounts 
are elicited.  A typical choice context is the following.  Suppose that you prefer to dine at a fancy 
French restaurant rather than the local Greek restaurant.  Would you rather eat French fancy this 
month and Greek local next, or vice versa?  For what price would you be willing to switch your 
choice? While the authors conclude that framing and contextual effects are consequential, they 
do not find evidence to support previous studies’ results that people favor improving sequences.   
Chabris et al. seek to unite the behavioral experimental literature on discounting and the 
empirical literature on risky behaviors that have an important time dimension.  First, they 
administered a series of delay discounting task questions from which it is possible to infer the 
individual’s rate of time preference.  They then linked the individual’s estimated discounting 
variable to risky behaviors in three different samples: a sample of people with risks associated 
with being overweight, a sample focusing on cognitive and decision making abilities, and a Web 
sample for which they considered a wide variety of risky behaviors.  These diverse risks included 
health risks such as BMI, exercise, dental checkups, and smoking, as well as financial risks such 
as gambling.  The authors find the expected correlations: impatient people have worse risk 
profiles, thus reinforcing Samuelson’s observations.  However, the simple correlations of 
discount rates with these risky behaviors are 0.09 to 0.38, which the authors view as low.  The 
strength of the effects makes it clear that factors beyond discounting, such as heterogeneity in 
individual tastes and geographic variation in cigarette taxes, help to drive these present-oriented 
behaviors.  The authors provide a theoretical model that explains why their findings are as strong 
as could be expected.   
Conclusion 
Discounting has become much more than a mere one-parameter exponential formula in 
economics.  It now spills over into philosophy and psychology, and assumes different forms 
depending on who is applying it and to what purpose.  Its appropriate use has become a subject 
15 
 
of intense debate wherever time-related choices must be made.  In short, discounting is a concept 
worthy of this journal volume on the dilemmas it raises.   
The time-related choices in this issue can be classified on two prime dimensions.  First, is 
a society or an individual making the decision?  Second, is the decision being prescribed or 
described, is it normative or behavioral?  In essence, this places discounting problems in a 2x2 
matrix, with most discussion on the diagonal, namely in the societal-normative box or the 
individual-behavioral box.  A great challenge is how and whether to cross between boxes.  If 
society is making the decision, of what normative value are the choices that individuals would 
make—with or without guidance—on those issues?   If we are prescribing for individuals, say in 
determining how much they should save, what guidance if any should we take from their 
behavioral proclivities?  And should the answer to that question depend on how long it will take 
for the outcome to be resolved, or whether their deviation from rational prescription relates 
mainly to time issues or to those of uncertainty?    
Our policy discussions have focused on issues that span decades, perhaps centuries.  This 
raises new classes of behavioral concerns.  Getting the discount rate for the initial period wrong, 
the affliction brought on by hyperbolic discounting, would seem to be much less consequential in 
such contexts than getting the sequence of discount rates for the next dozens of periods right.  
But even moderate hyperbolic preferences might postpone critical action against a long-term 
serious problem, and doubly so with generational selfishness.  Even when consequences stretch 
to posterity, both initial period and long-term rates are consequential. 
Long-term problems highlight other forms of irrationality, particularly those surrounding 
issues of uncertainty.  A frequently observed failure is that people do not recognize all pertinent 
states of the world; they have poor peripheral vision for unlikely possibilities.  The extreme case 
is that of ignorance—situations where the states of the world are not identified—when unlikely 
possibilities are slighted or not even recognized.10  Individuals might be excused in this respect, 
                                                          
10 On ignorance, see Zeckhauser (2006), who shows that individuals tend to discount unspecified possibilities.  
When the Exxon Valdez tanker ran aground at Bligh Reef, causing the nation’s biggest oil spill, the possibility that 
the ship captain would be drunk and would leave the bridge even though regulations required his presence until after 
the ship left Prince William Sound was not on Exxon’s roster of potential disasters.  Howard Raiffa likes to recount 
his lecture on fault trees at the National Academy of Sciences to illustrate the difficulty of identifying relevant states.  
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but surely government assessments should held to a higher standard.  Alas, regulatory policy 
assessments for environmental regulations often fail to recognize that there even is a long-term 
impact that should be taken into account.  Remarkably, not a single major U.S. regulation in 
2004 included an analysis of the effects of the regulation on future generations.11  The simplest 
way to avoid discounting errors in the treatment of the far future is simply not to see the future at 
all.  When long time periods and uncertainty impede ordinary vision, as the papers in this volume 
demonstrate, economics can serve as both searchlight and spectacles.        
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
He employed the example of why a car wouldn’t start.  After his presentation, he walked with colleagues to his car, 
and it failed to start.  It was the wrong car, an event not appearing on his fault tree.  A closely related hypothesis is 
that relating to support theory.  See Tversky and Koehler (1994) and Idson et al. (2001).  
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